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This chapter argues that systemic environmental changes in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East have the potential to combine with 
persistent political instability to create challenges for urban environments 
bordering the Mediterranean over the rest of the 21st century. These 
combined pressures could manifest themselves as unrest against city and 
state governance around the rim of the Mediterranean as these cities 
cope with the strains of population movements that will only gather 
momentum as the environmental pressures of higher temperatures, 
sea level rise and fresh water scarcity collide with inadequate urban 
infrastructures. Another central point of this chapter is that these 
challenges will fall mainly on city governments and their administrations. 
Mediterranean cities should neither expect nor count on relief from the 
states in which they exist. 
This chapter argues that environmental refugees driven by climate and 
environmentally driven factors will inexorably shape the landscapes of 
urban Mediterranean cities over the rest of the century (Brauch, 2003). 
These environmental refugees are related to but also distinct from the 
political refugees now attempting to emigrate to Europe as a result of the 
collapse of several Middle Eastern states such as Syria, Libya and Iraq. While 
environmental and political refugees fall into different legal and political 
categories, both phenomena can occur discretely or in tandem. In other 
words, environmental stresses can challenge the ability of governments 
to function effectively, which in turn can encourage migration flows. This 
chapter argues that these phenomena are linked in the Mediterranean 
area, since populations seeking to migrate are mostly coming from weak 
and/or failing states and are simultaneously affected by both political and 
environmental factors. After detailing some of these macro trends, the 
chapter will suggest some steps that could help cities successfully prepare 
for the crisis and reduce the prospects of unrest.
As noted in the title of this chapter, the fates of the cities on the 
northern and southern rims are linked in the impending crisis. 
Suggesting such a relationship is nothing new. Mediterranean rim cities 
1. The views in this article are those of 
the author.
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have always existed in a kind of symbiotic relationship. The cities of the 
southern shores – Oran, Algiers, Tripoli, Benghazi, Tunis, Cairo, Tel Aviv, 
Alexandria and Beirut – have always been interconnected with the cities 
of the northern shores – Athens, Venice, Genoa, Naples, Barcelona, 
Palermo, Nice, Istanbul and Marseille to name but a few. As far back as 
Roman times, these cities served as vital nodes of the interconnected 
Mediterranean economic and political world (Rice, 2008). 
Today, these cities exist as parts of broader social, political and economic 
systems that border the Mediterranean and its 46,000 km of shorelines 
from three continents, 22 states and an estimated 480 million people. 
Over half of the Mediterranean region’s population lives in coastal 
zones; 65 percent of the population of the southern zone (120 million 
people) currently lives in coastal zones. The populations along the 
northern coastline are mostly urbanised, while populations in North 
Africa are in the process of concentrating in urban areas. While the 
population in southern Europe is projected to decline into 2050, 
populations in North Africa are expected to increase from 139 million to 
240 million over the same period (European Environment Agency, 2017).
Mirroring global trends, Mediterranean populations are urbanising. 
Between 1970 and 2010, the populations bordering the Mediterranean 
increased by 190 million – 163 million of whom live in towns with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants. Urbanisation of these populations 
increased from 54%–66% over the same period. The south and east of 
the Mediterranean are urbanising at a faster pace, moving from 44% 
urbanised population in 1970 to a projected 66% by 2025.
2. Environmental pressures
Like the rest of the planet, the Mediterranean will see inexorable 
environmental changes that flow from the increase of greenhouse 
gases in the earth’s atmosphere. As early as 2001, researchers at the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, identified the 
region as particularly susceptible to the effects of climate change due 
to the concentration of populations in coastal regions, persistent fresh 
water shortages, and climate-sensitive crop production. Regrettably, 
the world keeps breaking records for carbon in the atmosphere. For the 
first time in recorded history, carbon levels reached 410 parts per million 
in 2017. Reflecting these persistent increases, the world keeps setting 
records for the hottest year on record: 2017 was the second hottest year 
on record, trailing only 2016 for this dubious distinction.
If states keep pumping carbon into the atmosphere at current rates, 
by the middle of the century, some researchers suggest that the 
atmosphere will come to resemble one that existed 50 million years 
ago when the temperature was 10 degrees Celsius higher than 
it is today – a world with no polar ice caps. Other researchers are 
somewhat more conservative. The IPCC predicts temperatures will 
increase by between 2°C and 3°C in the Mediterranean region by 
2050, and by between 3°C to 5°C by 2100. Predictably, the southern 
region will see even higher temperatures. The 2007 IPCC projections 
for the ENPSouth region (which includes ten non-EU Mediterranean 
countries) predict an increase in temperature of up to 2°C in the next 
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15 to 20 years and of 4°C to 6.5°C by the end of the 21st century. 
This increase in temperature is likely to be accompanied by a further 
decrease in the level of precipitation. In the IPCC 2013 projections, 
summer rainfalls could decrease by the end of the century by 35% 
on the southern rim, and by 25% on the northern rim. Other impacts 
of climate change include sea level rise (SLR). Drawing upon IPCC 
projections, researchers predict that the Mediterranean Sea could rise 
by as much as two feet by the end of the century. If the polar ice caps 
continue melting at current rates, sea level rises will be much more 
dramatic than the IPCC forecasts (IPCC, 2014).
3. Regional migration trends
These environmental and climate trends are an additional pressure 
on population migrations – migrations that, to be sure, are nothing 
new in the Mediterranean (Dragastovina, 2015). Between 2001 and 
2010, Spain, Italy and France were the largest recipients of Arab 
emigration in the OECD countries, numbering 5 million people into 
all of Europe (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012). Indeed there has been an 
inexorable trend of population migrations from the southern states 
to the northern European-based states. Europe’s aging population 
has created opportunities for the more youthful populations of the 
southern states. Over the last five years that population shift has 
been fuelled by the political instability of the Middle East due to 
the wars in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. The Middle East is today 
home to approximately 12 million displaced people and another 6 
million refugees, with millions stuffed into overcrowded, underfunded 
refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. There are now 1.2 
million outstanding applications for political asylum in Europe. These 
civil wars show no sign of abating in part due to the involvement of 
outside powers that are attempting to manipulate the armed struggle 
for political power in each of the wars. 
While the displaced and refugee populations of the Middle East provide 
a built-in migration demand push, it is important to note that they 
constitute only one source of migrants. The pressures for additional 
migration continue to build. For example, Libya alone is estimated to 
harbour as many as 1 million refugees from sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia trying to get across the Mediterranean to Europe. Statistics 
compiled by the UN Migration Agency document the sustained flow of 
tens of thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean annually from 
countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Eritrea, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast and other states in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Today, there is no question that the overwhelming number of refugees 
in the Middle East and Africa are related to political violence. In 2016, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel overtook the Middle East as the region 
of the world most affected by displaced populations due to political 
violence. In 2016 alone, nearly 1,000,000 residents of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo were displaced due to political violence in that 
country (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2017). The trends for displaced 
populations in the Middle East and Africa are an opposite mirror image 
of those figures in Asia – where climate and environmental factors figure 
much more prominently in causing displaced populations.
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The argument in this chapter is that the asymmetry between climate 
and politically driven refugees will even out between Asia and the 
Middle East/Africa. Stated differently, quite simply, the populations of 
the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa will be under increasing migration 
pressures as temperatures get hotter and the environment drier, 
with accompanying weather-related unpredictability. There can be 
no question that the states of the Middle East and Africa face a 
dangerous combination of climate and society fragility risk factors 
that could drive new waves of climate refugees (G7, 2015). Moreover, 
the states of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa lack the climate 
adaptive capacities of richer, developed states. Their infrastructures 
are already having trouble coping with existing population 
pressures (Bello-Schünemann et al., 2011). Head of the American 
Security Project, Retired Marine Corps General Stephen A Cheney, 
characterised the problem to researchers at the Environmental Justice 
Foundation as follows: “…wait 20 years and see what happens when 
climate change drives people out of Africa, the Sahel especially, 
and we are talking now not just one or two million but 10 to 20 
[million], and they are not going to South Africa, they are crossing the 
Mediterranean.”2 
4. Mediterranean cities and refugee populations
This chapter argues that deteriorating environmental conditions due 
to climate change combined with political instability threaten to 
turn this population movement from south to north into a veritable 
tsunami that will increase in force over the century as it impacts 
Mediterranean rim cities. Migrants will first swell the cities on the 
southern shores, stressing already overburdened infrastructures for 
housing, education, law enforcement, fresh water, sanitation and 
sewage, electricity generation, and garbage disposal. In short, they 
will make an already bad situation much worse. Many of these states: 
Morocco, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia already lack the capacity to deal 
with the migrant burdens now imposed upon them. Many of the new 
migrants will seek to join others crossing the Mediterranean by sea 
into the cities of the northern shore, creating a symbiotic mirror of 
the problems in the south that will be transported to the north.
How are these cities to address these multiple and interconnected 
crises? As a first step, city planners in the affected cities should avoid 
warehousing these populations in tent cities – as currently practiced 
by the UN. There is a growing awareness that there are useful lessons 
that can be learned from the world’s experiences in accommodating 
refugee and displaced populations. As noted by Kilian Kleinschmidt, 
former official with the UN High Commission on Refugees: “I think 
we have reached the dead end almost where the humanitarian 
agencies cannot cope with the crisis. We’re doing humanitarian aid 
as we did 70 years ago after the second world war. Nothing has 
changed.”3 People spend an average of 17 years in camps and, once 
constructed, these camps become permanent fixtures. 
Lessons from the UN’s experiences can be usefully combined with 
the principles of “Smart Cities” to develop templates that cities can 
use to adapt to the requirements of integrating climate refugees 
2. Quoted in Beyond Borders: Our 
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into expanding existing communities and build new ones (Robinson, 
2017). These principles, among other things, suggest a fundamental 
rethinking of how planners design urban spaces and the technological 
platforms that can assist in integrating these spaces into vibrant, 
productive urban environments. Other research proposes that new 
urban areas focus upon creating sustainable economic opportunity 
and development zones to economically empower the migrant 
populations and make the urban areas economically sustainable 
(Refugee Cities, 2016). 
Another avenue of adaptation for cities is to examine the experiences 
of planners at the annual Burning Man festival that establishes a 
community of 50,000+ people at Blackrock in the Nevada desert. For 
example, the festival launched a competition in 2016 called the Big 
Book of Ideas that resulted in over 100 plans designed by experts in 
30 different countries. Such outreach could be used by Mediterranean 
cities to generate ideas and thinking as they contemplate the looming 
wave of environmental refugees. 
Considering the prospect of adding to existing and/or creating new 
urban areas represents an opportunity for Mediterranean cities 
to take advantage of the theories suggesting a shift from cities 
designed based on the principles of centralised authority, hierarchy 
and institutionalism. Instead, planners can view these urban areas in 
holistic terms as complex social, physical and cultural ecosystems – 
principles around which to design new spaces and adapt old ones. 
This can lead planners into thinking about how to design urban 
spaces in ways that promote cultural assimilation, self-governance and 
relative economic independence (Williams, 2017).
5. Implications for violence and unrest
Despite regrettable popular perceptions to the contrary, violent 
extremism and terrorism do not necessarily go hand in hand with 
migration. Political violence that manifests itself as terrorism is a 
complex phenomenon, and there is no consensus on the causes of 
radicalisation that results in attacks. Research points to myriad factors: 
structural factors in society that cause political alienation; a personal 
grievance that stems from some sort of act by a political actor; or 
charismatic leadership of a group that attracts followers, for example 
(McCormick, 2003). Suffice to say, however, migrants have been 
involved in a number of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, including 
Paris (March 2015, 137 killed and 413 injured), Brussels (March 2016, 
35 killed and 340 injured) and Manchester (May 2017, 23 killed 
and 512 injured). As many as 5,000 Europeans have gone to the 
battlefields in the Middle East to fight in support of Islamic extremism. 
An estimated 1,500 have returned home to be reintegrated into their 
respective societies, with thousands more in refugee camps in Turkey 
and elsewhere awaiting repatriation (Schmitt, 2017). 
The European Union and its host governments have created new data 
bases and greatly increased intelligence sharing with each other and 
their law enforcement agencies to gather and collate information 
on returning militants. This information sharing from such agencies 
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as Europol is wending its way into the police departments of many 
European cities. This information will help but will not eliminate the 
threat of future attacks – which are sure to occur. 
It remains unclear how long the Middle East will remain unstable – 
with the havens this instability provides for violent extremists. Despite 
the taking of Raqqa and Mosul from ISIS in 2017, there has been 
an undeniable migration of ISIS fighters not killed or rounded up 
there to Libya, the Sahel in Sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere (UN, 
2017). As a phenomenon, ISIS needs to be seen more as symptom 
than as an actual problem. Regional instability stems from unsettled 
political and religious arguments that show no signs of being settled. 
The region’s authoritarian regimes show no interest in creating 
viable political processes under which the grievances can be settled 
peacefully. Further complicating the environment is that groups like 
ISIS are committed revolutionaries that are so far uninterested in 
accommodation – meaning there can be no negotiated settlement 
even if a political process existed to address grievances. Lastly, the 
instability is also fed by regional rivals in Riyadh, Tehran and Tel Aviv, 
and Moscow and Washington – ensuring that the wars in places 
like Syria, Yemen and Libya will continue longer than they otherwise 
would.
The argument of this chapter is that migrant flows from persistent 
instability are becoming joined with and will almost certainly be 
subsumed by migrant flows created by environmental and climate 
pressures. Environmental refugees are a different kind of displaced 
and refugee population. It is not axiomatic that the Mediterranean 
cities of the northern and southern rims will see unrest and instability 
as the migrant flows build over the rest of the century – although 
some violence and instability is inevitable. While much is made of 
the prospect of violent extremists infiltrating societies as part of the 
refugee/displaced person flows, much more serious is what happens 
to these populations once they arrive and the degree of integration 
and assimilation into new societies with differing cultures. It is 
imperative that the rim cities begin collaborating now to deal with 
these issues.
6. Conclusion
The chapter argues that the pressures of environmental refugees 
will gather inexorable momentum over the rest of the century and 
beyond as the earth’s environment continues to deteriorate – with 
catastrophic consequences for humanity. For the Mediterranean 
region, however, all is not lost. As noted at the outset of the chapter, 
the cities bordering this great body of water have had a long, 
symbiotic relationship with one another. Cooperatively planning 
now for the migrant flows that will materialise from climate change 
represents an opportunity for the cities to restructure themselves 
in ways that reflect the advances in city planning and urban design 
offered by Smart and Wise City design principles. This could allow 
the cities to turn these populations into positive, environmentally 
sustainable forces with economic, political, social, technological and 
cultural vitality. 
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Increased migrant flows will invariably stress the already-strained urban 
infrastructures of the rim cities. They will also create challenges for 
stability and security. Environmental refugees and their political brethren 
from the Middle East’s broken societies are sure to arrive with political, 
cultural and religious expectations – not all of which will be successfully 
met no matter how smart and wise their host cities may be. 
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the rim cities and the host 
states will be the politics that accompany embracing and accepting 
migrant populations. Recent developments both in Europe and the 
United States show the dangerous mismatch between the strategic 
realities of climate change and the associated political reaction that 
feeds xenophobic and reactionary policies. Given their long history 
that goes back to Roman times, however, perhaps the rim cities of the 
Mediterranean can avoid this outcome and embrace the opportunities 
and challenges represented by the coming wave of environmental 
refugees.
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